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KIDS, LEAVE THE GUNS AT HOME: WHY MARYLAND'S "GOOD
AND SUBSTANTIAL REASON" REQUIREMENT COMPORTS WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL AIMS IN THE POST-HELLER ERA
by Julia Johnson

I. INTRODUCTION
After the Supreme Court's seminal holding in
District of Columbia v. Heller, lower courts have struggled to ascertain the scope of individual handgun rights
conferred by the Second Amendment.' Heller's narrow
holding, conspicuously silent as to the Court's views regarding handgun access outside the home, has provided
only limited guidance for lower courts. 2 In declining to
promulgate a modern conception of the boundaries of
Second Amendment rights, Heller has left lower courts
scrambling upon review of many State gun-control policies, leaving some of these courts to erroneously cling
to tangential analysis insufficiently correlated to the
issue at hand.' As in Woollard v. Sheridan,' this consequent misanalysis has resulted in policy implications
that stray far from aims of the Framers.
In Woollard, the Court undertook review of
Maryland's handgun provision and determined that the
requirement was unconstitutional pursuant to a supposedly logical, yet wholly untenable, line of reasoning.

1

See Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami ofLe-

gal Uncertainty: What a Court to Do Post-Mc-

Donald?, 21 Comell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 489, 490-1
(2012).
2

Id.

3
4

Id.
Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462

Instead, per the rationale developed in this article, the
Court failed to recognize that the Second Amendment
right to handgun access outside the home, if one exists
at all, is neither guaranteed nor extensive, but are qualified and limited by public safety considerations.
II. FACTS
Pursuant to Maryland's Criminal Law Code,
§4-203 (hereafter "provision"), the State of Maryland
mandates that an individual carrying a gun outside the
home, either as open or concealed carry, must possess
a State-issued handgun permit.' To obtain a permit, an
applicant must first demonstrate that he lacks specific
criminal or drug convictions, has a stable character,
and is neither addicted to drugs nor an alcoholic.' In
addition, the Secretary of the State Police (hereafter
"Secretary") must determine that the applicant "has
good and substantial reason to wear, carry, or transport
a handgun" before the permit may be issued.' The
Handgun Permit Unit (hereafter "Permit Unit") serves
as the Secretary's designee and reviews applications for
handgun permits within the State.' In making a decision
on an applicant's file, the Permit Unit looks to four "general categories" demonstrating a "good and substantial
reason" under which reasonable need for handgun use
outside the home may occur.9 An applicant must successfully demonstrate one of these factors to be granted
a permit.' 0
At issue here is the fourth and final provision,
"personal protection."" To succeed pursuant to this
provision, an applicant must demonstrate "some sort

(D. Md. 2012), abrogated by Woollard v. Gallagher, 5
712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2014)(Reversing and
6

Id. at 464.
Id. at 465.

providing that "[w]e are convinced by the State's
evidence that there is a reasonable fit between the
good-and-substantial-reason requirement and Maryland's objectives of protecting public safety and
preventing crime").

7

Id.

8

Id.

9
10
11

Id.
Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
Id.
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of objectively heightened threat, above and beyond
the 'personal anxiety' or apprehension of an average
person."12
If the Permit Unit denies an applicant after
review, the applicant may appeal to the Handgun Permit
Review Board (hereafter "Board"), which will either
reverse or confirm the decision.'" Upon appeal, the
Board also utilizes a multi-factor criterion to determine
whether the Permit Unit's decision should be upheld.1 4
On December 24, 2002, Plaintiff Raymond
Woollard was at home in rural Baltimore County,
Maryland, when Kris Lee Abbott broke into the home to
obtain his wife's car keys to drive into the city to purchase drugs.'" During the incident, Woollard and Abbott
engaged in a violent quarrel wherein the use of deadly
force was threatened."6 Abbott received a sentence of
three years' probation after being charged with firstdegree burglary for the incident, and was subsequently
incarcerated after violating his probation terms."
In 2003, Woollard applied, and was approved,
for a handgun permit in order to protect himself from
Abbott. The permit was renewed in 2006 after Abbott's
prison release." However, when Woollard again applied
in 2009 to renew his handgun permit, his application
was denied after the Permit Unit concluded that he had
failed to produce sufficient evidence demonstrating a
present threat necessitating the use of a handgun, and
the Unit held that "general self-defense" was an inadequate basis for granting a permit."'
Woollard appealed the decision via both the
informal review procedures of the Permit Unit and, subsequently, to the Board, which confirmed the denial.2 0
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Heller, the Supreme Court held that a District
of Columbia provision causing the absolute prohibition of firearm use for self-defense within the home
unconstitutionally violated the Second Amendment.2 1

Acknowledging that handgun violence in the nation
continues to pose a threat to public safety, the Court
maintained that "the enshrinement of constitutional
rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the
table."2 2 Despite the Court's vehemence in safeguarding
individual handgun access within the home, Heller failed
to provide guidance as to the transferability of these
rights outside the home.2 3 The foregoing policy restrictions were extended to the governing bodies of the
States in McDonald v. City of Chicago.2 4
Fortunately for courts scrambling to comprehend Heller's bounds, the Supreme Court flagged two
limitations on the right: (1) restrictions upon the types
of weapons whose use is protected and (2) "presumptively lawful regulatory measures." 25 Regarding the
former, only those weapons "typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes" fall under the
scope of Second Amendment protections. 26 However,
as to the latter, courts have grappled to comprehend
Heller's interpretation of "presumptively lawful" measures and multiple interpretations are plausible.2 7
In addition, laws limiting an individual's capacity for self-defense, may be less likely to pass constitutional muster because this capacity is "fundamental"
to the Second Amendment right and even its "central
component." 28 However, an individual's right to selfdefense via firearms generally becomes more limited
outside of the home because "public safety interests
often outweigh individual interests in self-defense."2 9
Despite concern over Heller's ambiguities, a
two-prong test is often used for analysis of Second
Amendment challenges." Upon review of a Second

22

Id. at 636.

23
24
25

Id. at 635.
130 S.Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010).
UnitedStates v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 676

(4th Cir. 2010) (citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
625 (2008)).

12
13
14

Id.
Id.
Id.

15

Id.

26

16

Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 465.

17

Id.

18
19
20
21

Id
Id.
Id.
District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S.

570, 635-36 (2008).
6

Washington College of Law

27
Id. (Stating that presumptively lawful
requirements may include provisions that "regulate
conduct outside the scope of the Second Amendment," or those that "pass muster under any standard of scrutiny.")
28
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Un ited States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85,

91 (3d Cir. 2010).
29
UnitedStates v. Masciandaro,638 F.3d 458,

470 (4th Cir. 2011).
30
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Chester, 628 F.3d at 680.
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Amendment claim, the receiving court must first determine "whether the challenged law imposes a burden on
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee" as it was historically understood
"at the time of ratification."" If the court determines
that the provision does burden an individual's Second
Amendment rights, then the court next undertakes analysis of the issue under the latter prong, and applies "an
appropriate form of means-end scrutiny."3 2 Conversely,
if the issue does not affect these rights, the analysis
ends there."

tiny do not lend themselves to easy decision-making."
Under intermediate scrutiny review, the fit between
the legitimate goal and regulation undertaken for its
furtherance need not be perfect, but merely substantial, and does "not require that a regulation be the least
intrusive means of achieving the relevant government
objective, or that there be no burden whatsoever on
the individual right." 4 0 Consequently, in determining
the constitutionality of a given provision, lower courts
may be in for a tumultuous ride - one that hinges solely
upon a determination of "reasonableness."

After determining review of the challenged provision is appropriate, a court must ascertain the most
suitable "form of means-end scrutiny."3 4 Particularly, as
the severity of the burden increases, the level of scrutiny applied should become more stringent, whereas
"laws that merely regulate rather than restrict . . . may
be more easily justified.""

IV. HOLDING

Many courts have determined that intermediate
scrutiny is the most appropriate standard of review for
state gun-control regulations." Heller failed to articulate the proper level of scrutiny for analysis of Second
Amendment contentions"; however, the Court rejected
rational basis review. Since strict scrutiny is likely to
deprive lawmakers of their capacities to create legislation to fight against "armed mayhem," intermediate
scrutiny is often used to analyze the irreconcilable tension between individual rights and public safety considerations."
Firearm provisions under intermediate scru-

31
Id. As an example of regulation deemed
"presumptively lawful," Heller and its progeny
have continually upheld "longstanding regulatory

measures," including barring handgun access to
felons and the mentally ill, handgun restrictions imposed in schools and government buildings, certain
restrictions on the carry of concealed weapons, and
"laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms."
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Chester 628 F.3d at 682 (citing United
States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 813-14 (2009) (vacated)).
36
Id. at 682.
37
Id.
38
Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 471.

The Woollard Court determined that while
the State undeniably has a legitimate goal in reducing
handgun access, the "good and substantial reason" requirement failed to achieve these aims in a satisfactory
manner.41 Instead, the Court criticized the provision
as overbroad, indiscriminate, and "not tailored to the
problem it is intended to solve." 42
In undertaking the analysis of Woollard's
contentions, the Court followed other jurisdictions in
determining that intermediate scrutiny review was appropriate. 43 As in United States v. Masciandaro, which
held that "a lesser showing is necessary with respect to
laws that burden the right to keep and bear arms outside the home,"4 4 the Woollard Court also agreed that
strict scrutiny review was improper because Woollard's
claims pertained exclusively to handgun use outside the
home, where the necessity for handgun access was less
acute.4 5 Intermediate scrutiny was most fitting because
Woollard's claims fell "within this same category of noncore Second Amendment protection."4 6
The Court then delved into an original analysis of the scope of an individual's Second Amendment
rights to handgun possession outside the home.4 7 Acknowledging that its precedent had declined to explore
this murky issue in fear of the ramifications of so doing,

39

Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to

Keep andBear Arms for Se/f-Defense: an Analyti-

cal Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA

L. Rev. 1443, 1470 (2009).
40
41
42
43
44

Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 474.
Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
Id.
Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 460.
Id. at 469-71.

45

Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 475.

46
47

Id.at 468.
Id.
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the Woollard Court declared that it could not resolve
the instant case without venturing "into the unmapped
reaches of Second Amendment jurisprudence."4 8 Thereafter, the Court embarked upon an ambitious quest
to reach its own conclusion, clinging to the few clues
provided in Heler.
Beginning its analysis, the Court first sought
guidance from the express terms of Heller. Alleging
that Heller's declaration that the need for self-defense
was "most acute" in the home necessarily supported
the existence of an area where this need is not "most
acute," the Woollard Court opined that logic demanded
handgun rights outside the home.4 9 In addition, citing
dicta from Mosciandaro that "the Second Amendment's
protections must extend beyond the home," because
"self-defense has to take place wherever [a] person
happens to be,"s0 the Woollard Court proposed that the
Second Amendment's provisions necessarily implied an
individual right to handgun access outside the home for
general self-defense.s" However, the Court remained
silent on the scope of this right extending beyond the
facts of the instant case.5 2
Next, the Court reviewed Woollard's three
attacks upon the constitutionality of Maryland's handgun provision. Decrying the shortfalls of the provision,
Woollard alleged that the regulation (1) "vests unbridled
discretion" in State officials, (2) is insufficiently tailored
to the State's legitimate interest in public safety, and
(3) operates as a flagrant violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Regarding Woollard's first contention, the Court
dispelled a finding that State officials possessed "unbri-

dled discretion" while applying provisions of the statute
because the Secretary had developed criterion to guide
decision-making and to limit official discretion.5 4 Moreover, the Court pointed to an applicant's capacity to appeal permit denials through full review by the Board."
Regarding Woollard's second contention, the
Court instigated analysis as to whether Maryland's
"good and substantial" requirement was adequately
tailored to public safety considerations. To pass constitutional muster, a gun-control mechanism must be

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Id. at 469.
Id. at 469.
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 468.
Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472- 73.
Id. at 474.

https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss1/2
8

Washington College of Law

Fall 2095

"narrow, objective and definite."" Utilizing intermediate scrutiny as a lens, the Court conceded that the fit
between the legislation and the State interest "need not
be perfect."
Nonetheless, the Court held that the Maryland
provision failed to withstand intermediate scrutiny
because the challenged legislation overly burdened individual rights, while failing to adequately promote public
safety." The Court chided the provision as a "rationing
system" whose effects were akin to "a law indiscriminately limiting the issuance of a permit to every tenth
applicant.""
In addition, the Court opined that the "good
and substantial reason" requirement was unlikely to
improve public safety because the challenged regulation
placed deadly weapons in the hands of those individuals
most likely to be victimized, and thus, those individuals
with the greatest propensity to "use them in a violent
situation." 0 Accordingly, while conceding the State's
valid interest in ensuring public safety, the "good and
substantial reason" requirement insufficiently furthered
these aims.'
V. ANALYSIS
In quashing the Maryland handgun provision,
the Court erred via several avenues in its comprehension of contemporary Second Amendment jurisprudence and acceptable restrictions upon individual
handgun rights. First, Maryland's handgun provision
does not necessarily fall within Heller's boundaries, the
narrow holding of which was limited to handgun access
exclusively within the home. 6 2 Second, even if Heller encompassed the facts of the instant case, Heller bars only
the absolute prohibition of handguns;6 1 whereas here,
handguns may be made available to those individuals

56

Id. at 472.

57

Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 475.

58
Id. at 474-75.
59
Id. at 474.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 475 (the Court declined to review
Woollard's third contention that the Maryland provision was an Equal Protection challenge pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment because Woollard's
Second Amendment claim provided a sufficient
framework to analyze the manner).
62
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640
(7th Cir. 2010).
63
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635-36.
4
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with demonstrated need6 4 and, therefore, the legislation
merely serves to regulate handgun access outside the
home, whilst leaving handgun rights within the home
unaffected." Finally, the Court speciously overlooked
the core, fundamental aim of the Second Amendment
right - facilitating an individual's capacity for self-de-

fense.66
Thus, Heller neither supports the creation of
handgun rights for "general self-defense" outside the
home, nor does it disavow the categorical exclusions
present in Maryland's handgun provision."7 In holding
that MAnrland

scniiaht to

reach ite unkli- inforoctc in n

A. A Right to Individual Handgun Access is Not Presupposed under Heller
At no point in Heller was a right to handgun possession outside the home either discussed
or recognized, and "the ruling itself was exceedingly
narrow" with the Court leaving "numerous questions
undecided."7 2 Woollard, swaying against the bulk of
those decisions rendered by other courts, found a
ready companion in Heller and McDonald," but given
their limited expanse, these opinions should not have
formed the basis for a contention that lay only on the
periphery of Heller's limited proscriptions.7 4 As stated
aptly in Pirszczatoski v. Filko, "if the . . . Court . . . had
intended to create a broader general right to carry for
self-defense outside the home, Heller would have done
so explicitly.""
Moreover, Heller explicitly banned only the
absolute prohibition of handguns, 6 whereas Maryland's
handgun provision merely regulates individual access to
handguns but stops short of absolutely prohibiting their
use throughout the entire populace.
Consequently,
when Heller averred that the guarantee under the
Second Amendment "necessarily takes certain policy
choices off the table,"" the Maryland provision is not
encompassed within these restrictions.

constitutionally impermissible manner," Woollard cites
neither precedent nor doctrine to buttress its claims,
but instead pulls this idea from the sky. Consequently,
the Woollard Court's handiwork is wholly at odds with
the purpose for the Second Amendment's founding, 9
deviates from other jurisdictions,7 0 and spikes the deepest fears of public safety activists."

In addition to improperly applying Heller, Woollard also fell prey to shoddy logic. Particularly, Woollard
egregiously erred by entertaining the logical fallacy
that individual handgun rights must necessarily extend
beyond the home." Heller's safeguarding of handgun

Violence Rates, 9 Journal of Quant. Crim. 249, 250
64

Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d. at 475.

(1993).

65

Id. at 469.

66

Moore v. Madigan, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1092,

72
Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, Harv. L. Rev. 246, 267
(2008).
73
Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 466.
74
See, e.g., State v, Knight, 218 P.3d 1177,
1189-90 (Kan. App. 2009); Williams v. State, 10
A.3d 1167, 1176 (Md. 2011).

1103 (C.D. Ill. 2012).
67
68
69

Heller, 554 U.S. at 635-36.
Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 475.
Patrick J. Charles, Scribble Scrabble, The

SecondAmendment, andHistoricalGuideposts:
A Short Reply to Lawrence Rosenthal andJoyce

Lee Malcom, 105 Nw. U.L. Rev. 227, 229 (2011)
(stating that "the fact of the matter is that the entire
purpose of the Second Amendment was the furtherance of the 'public good"').
70
See Moore, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1103; Piszczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 835 (D. N. J.
2012).

71

Gary Kleck & E. Britt Patterson, The Im-

pact of Gun Control and Gun Ownership Levels on

75
76
77
78

840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 833 (D.N.J. 2012).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635-36.
Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 465.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.

Piszczatoski, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 828 (not79
ing "the logical fallacy of the plaintiff's argument
that the sensitive places exception necessitates the
interpretation that the Supreme Court recognized
a general right to carry outside the home is easily
demonstrated").
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rights within the home, where this need is "most acute,"
does not automatically sustain an inference that those
rights apply where "that need is not 'most acute."'"
The absolute grant of a right in one arena does not,
without more, transfer this right into another realm.
Instead, logical reasoning allows for speculation that
this right (1) may pertain exclusively to the home, as
the term "most acute" operates merely as a descriptive qualifier," (2) may exist in only a limited capacity
outside the home, one which excludes "general selfdefense,"8 2 and (3) may be limited to certain qualifying
individuals following government action, such as after
granting a handgun permit, as depicted in the Maryland
provision. 3 Consequently, when Woollard opined that
an individual need only "the right's existence" to gain
an ability to exercise his right, the Court presupposed
the presence of a right to handgun access outside the
home, in situations akin to Woollard's, when none may
exist.84
B. Heller and its Progeny Do Not Support the Woollard
Court's Decision

Maryland's handgun provision should not be
rendered constitutionally infirm as a consequence of its
restrictive, categorical criterion because the provision
does not violate the policy forbearances of Heller and
McDonald.15

80

Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 467.

81
Gonzales v. Village of West Milwaukee, No.
09-CV-0384, 2010 WL 1904977, at *4 (E.D. Wis.
May 11, 2010) ("the Supreme Court has never held
that the Second Amendment protects the carrying of
guns outside the home").
82
Piszczatoski, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 828 ("logic
does not bear the argument that the Supreme Court
necessarily recognizes a general right to carry for
self-defense").

83
84

Id. at 832-33.
Kachalsky, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 265-66

("Heller specifically limited its ruling to interpreting the [Second A]mendment's protection of the
right to possess handguns in the home, not the right
to possess handguns outside of the home in case of
confrontation").
85
Moore, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 ("the Supreme Court in Heller clearly affirmed the government's power to regulate and restrict possession of
firearms outside the home").
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clp/vol3/iss1/2
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Furthering this contention, strong government
regulation pertaining to handgun access outside the
home, as demonstrated in the Maryland provision, harmonizes with Heller. Heller, by intentionally withholding
guidance to State lawmakers for developing appropriate
legislation, fosters an inference of the Supreme Court's
intention to allow broad latitude to the States in instigating handgun regulations." Consequently, given that
the Woollard Court concedes this latitude, Woollard's
holding is seemingly unsubstantiated, as the provision
does not arbitrarily take the right away from a given individual, but instead weighs public safety considerations
with individual interest, taking away the right whereas
necessary to further overall public welfare- actions
which are hallmark characteristics of constitutionally
permissible government regulation."
C. The Maryland Provision Comports with the Self-Defense "Core" of the Second Amendment
Finally, as safeguarding an individual's capacity for self-defense is the "central component" of the
Second Amendment right," Woollard erred by failing to
fully consider the safety ramifications for both the individual and the public at large - the majority of whom
choose not to possess a handgun." While an individual's right to handgun access inside his or her home remains sacrosanct per Heller,"o once an individual leaves
his home, it would be perturbingly unpalatable that he
should have the unfettered right to carry a handgun on
his person for self-defense as he sees fit. Utilizing "selfdefense" as an impetus for its instigation,' Maryland's
handgun restriction comports with good policy sense
because limiting handgun access to certain groups will
result in heightened self-defense capacities amongst the
majority of citizens, most of whom are unarmed, as well
as improvements in overall safety.9 2
Therefore, by limiting handgun access to those
individuals who most benefit from their protection, the

86
87
88

Id.
Piszczatoski, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
Masciandaro,638 F.3d at 470; Kachalsky,

817 F. Supp. 2d at 258 ("emphasis on the Second
Amendment's protection of the right to keep and
bear arms for the purpose of 'self-defense' in the
home' permeates the Court's decision and forms the

basis for its holding").
89
Joseph Blocher, The Right Not to Keep or
Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REv 1, 4 (2012).
90
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
91
Kachalsky, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 258.
92
Blocher, supra note 90 at 5.
6
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Maryland provision aims to improve individual security;
where it does not, public safety considerations strongly
outweigh the hindrance upon an individual's rights."
The foregoing also comports with public policy aims by
limiting the use of handguns in a rational, steadfast, and
generally predictable manner.9 4
Moreover, though Woollard decries the legislation as leading to an increase in accidental shootings,"
the Court ignores the consequences of dismembering
the handgun provision. As more permissive regulation
is likely to result in an increase in the number of handguns within the State, unintentional injuries and deaths
are actually more likely to occur under the latter option. 9

to those same citizens that the Constitution simultaneously aspires to protect."

VI. CONCLUSION

To conclude, Maryland's handgun regulation accords with constitutional aims and its shortcomings are
insufficient to render it infirm under Heller. In undertaking original analysis of the scope of individual handgun
rights under the Second Amendment, Woollard ignored
all of the bedrock concerns of both the Framers and
policymakers and erred grotesquely in analyzing the
provision, leaving reasonableness, logic, and data in its
wake.

Thus, as the Maryland provision limits handgun
access to only those individuals most likely to receive a
benefit from their protection, any attempt to alter the
challenged legislation will likely result in a net increase
in handgun use in the State.97 Research studies have
proven a strong, positive correlation between individual
access to handguns and deadly violence; therefore,
increasing individual handgun access outside the home
is unlikely to confer benefits in excess of the detriment
wrought by doing." Consequently, policy initiatives
certainly comport with a limited exercise of handgun
rights, and it is incredibly unlikely that the Framers
would today champion such a deleterious and dangerous exercise of the Second Amendment rights granted

93
94

Id. at 53.
Mark S. Kaplan & Olga Geling, Firearm

Suicides and Homicides in the United States: Regional Variations and Patternsof Gun Ownership,
46 Soc. Sc. & MED. 1227, 1232 (1998) (discuss-

ing correlation between gun ownership and rates of
homicide and suicide amongst multiple demographics).

95
Woollard, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 462.
96
Kaplan & Geling, supra note 95 at 1232-3;
contra Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcom,
McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standardof Scrutiny
Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 Nw. U.L.

Rev. 437, 459 (2011).
97

See, e.g., People v. Perkins, 880 N.Y.S.2d

209, 210 (3d Dep't. May 21, 2009) ("New York's
licensing requirement remains an acceptable means
of regulating the possession of firearms and will not
contravene Heller so long as it is not enforced in an
arbitrary and capricious manner").
98
See id.

See Charles, supra note 71 at 1823 ("the
99
question is whether the founders would have accepted the restriction as necessary to prevent "public injury" or as in the interest of the "public good.
This question is answered by examining the ideological and philosophical origins of gun control").
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